Round 2: Using Ownership to Resolve Investment and Pricing Issues in Transmission and Distribution by Meade, Richard
ROUND II: USING OWNERSHIP
TO RESOLVE INVESTMENT
AND PRICING ISSUES IN
TRANSMISSION AND
DISTRIBUTION
12 April 2006
Richard Meade
Research Principal, ISCR
Principal, Cognitus Advisory Services Limited
Lecturer, Victoria University SEF and Management School
richard.meade@cognitus.co.nz
• Now examine how “customer” ownership might sufficiently
resolve market power and investment problems while:
– Preserving decentralised decision making
– Avoiding the direct and indirect costs of regulation
• Start with a reminder about the costs of regulation
• Highlight how ownership and regulation are just forms of
governance
• Make the case for customer ownership of distribution, and then
extend to transmission
• Discuss where the model arises in practice
• Draw some policy conclusions
OVERVIEW
COSTS OF REGULATION
Direct costs are significant and growing:
• Regulator’s own costs of administration
• Regulated companies’ costs of compliance
• Company and customer costs of participation
Indirect costs can be even more telling:
• Distorted costs, prices, quantity, quality, financial risks,
maintenance, investment, …
• Unintended temporal and inter-temporal redistributions
Sooner or later customers wear these costs
THE PROBLEM IS GOVERNANCE
Tirole (2001) definition:
“the design of institutions that induce or force management to
internalize the welfare of stakeholders”
If the goal is protecting customers of natural
monopolies from abuse, while sustaining efficient
investments:
• Regulation → can be effective, but costly/distorting
• Market contracting → effective for larger customers, but …
• Ownership → efficiency and market power implications
Which combination of these governance tools is best?
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Goal = alignment of firm/manager and customer interests
Arrow = governance conflict with associated costs
Source: Meade (2005)
OWNERSHIP AS A SOLUTION
Extending Hansmann (Ownership of Enterprise,
1996) – ownership efficiently falls to those firm
patrons facing the least combined costs of:
• Regulation
• Market contracting – including market power abuse
• Ownership, including:
– Costs of separating ownership from control
– Costs of collective decision making
If ownership is costly but can mitigate market power,
then trade ownership costs against regulation costs
• First-order issue is vulnerability of customers to
market power abuse due to natural monopoly
characteristics
• Reliability and inter-temporal efficiency/equity in
investment also a concern where ownership non-
tradable
• Ownership solutions should work well where:
– Business risks low, and assets highly bankable
– Services and customers homogeneous
– Technology and customer base stable
DISTRIBUTION
DISTRIBUTION (CONT’D)
Customer ownership of distribution, in particular,
can mitigate market power:
• Direct participation in the governance process
• Choice of objective function – non-profit/multiple vs. for-profit
• Share in excess returns from market power → “monopoly hedge”
Customer ownership can also support investment:
• Investment conflicts due to non-tradable ownership mitigated by
equal control rights (or lack thereof)
• Reduced need for regulation and its investment distortions
• Costs of inaction borne by those with a vested interest
• Market power concerns arise as for distribution
• The coordination problem – investment complicated by:
– Hold-ups
– Network externalities
– Interactions with generation, demand-side management, …
• Key – grid off-takers (consumers) are most adversely
affected by grid constraints and associated congestion:
– Injectors (generators) more price-elastic than off-takers (?)
– Injectors can actually favour congestion
• Market power/investment concerns suggest “customer”
ownership as a solution (but not 1989 “club” model)
TRANSMISSION
• Costs of grid ownership mitigated by indirect customer ownership
of grid (i.e. via distribution ownership)
• Market power issues resolved as for distribution, even if indirectly
• Any market power abuse of generators is self-defeating (and/or
merits much narrower regulation)
• Off-takers as a class have direct incentives to:
– Resolve coordination problem with generators
– Make credible commitments and avoid opportunism
• Does not resolve grid investment and pricing decisions, but:
– Shifts them onto those with strongest incentives to resolve them
– Removes an important layer of regulatory cost and uncertainty
TRANSMISSION (CONT’D)
• UK – flirted with a “club” in the early 1990s, but backed away due
to distributor ownership of generation (and price controls used)
• Denmark – 40-50% customer ownership the norm, with
municipals not far behind (although profits or revenues now
controlled):
– Covers generation, transmission and distribution/retailing
– Renewables investments mostly customer-owned
• US – rural lines coops are legion:
– Number almost 1,000 (vs 1,500 municipals); arise in 46 states; own
45% of all lines; supply 10% of population
– 47% not subject to rate regulation, 19% subject to optional regulation
(8:1 opting out)
– Many also own upstream G&T coops, some of which also escape
regulation
• NZ – 67% of distribution owned by customers, yet price controls
imposed (and 1989 Transpower “club” didn’t fly)
THE MODEL IN PRACTICE?
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Don’t assume centralised regulation is the only way:
• Offer regulatory “menus” conditioned on ownership
• Regulate customer-owned monopolies in electricity only where
the need clearly exceeds all the associated costs
• Exploit customer ownership as an efficient decentralised
solution to market power and investment problems
Glachant (2002):
“public regulation is not better in principle than private
negotiation for dealing with market failure”
“some externalities and asset specificities can be managed
within private clubs of partners or users, limiting the scope of
public regulatory bodies”
Thank you – any questions?
